The paper examines the cross-country association between nominal money and real output between 1990 and 2000. Both high money growth rates and declines in money are connected with below-average output growth rates. The association between the monetary base and real output is weaker than the association between M1 (or M2) and real output. We observe no tendency of money changes to precede output changes.
Introduction
One of the most important and interesting problems in macroeconomics is whether nominal money has real effects. Most economists believe that money is neutral in the long run but nonneutral in the short run. Friedman and Schwartz (1963) and Romer and Romer (1989) show that money mattered in the United States. Other studies of the nonneutrality of money include Barro (1978) , Wogin (1980) , Attfield, Demery, and Duck (1981) , Attfield and Duck (1983) , and Kormendi and Meguire (1984) .
The present paper's goal is to complement the existing literature by providing evidence from all countries for which we have data in the 1990-2000 period. The data are taken from
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We exclude observations for which there was a methodological change. The paper focuses on the average behavior of the real output growth in extreme situations -falls in monetary aggregates and high growth rates of money (above 50% per year). The output growth is found to be low in both of these extreme situations.
One of the research questions addressed in this paper is whether the behavior of output is more adverse for falls in the monetary base, M1, or M2. It is found that the behavior of output is more adverse for falls in M1 than for falls in the monetary base, and slightly more adverse for falls in M2 than for falls in M1. Hence broader monetary aggregates are more strongly associated with real output than narrower monetary aggregates. This observation is consistent with my findings in Duczynski (2001a Duczynski ( , 2001b , where I examine earlier data.
Another research question is whether there exists a tendency of money changes to precede output changes. Unlike GDP, the monetary aggregates are measured from end-of-year data. If T is the year in which the monetary variable falls, the output growth in T (between T-1 and T) in some sense precedes the monetary change in T (the growth rate of output is derived from the output behavior both in T-1 and T). Similarly, the output growth in T+1 follows the monetary change in T. If the output performance between T and T+1 were on average more adverse than the output performance between T-1 and T, it would be an indication that money changes precede output changes. However, this is not observed in the data. In contrast, in Duczynski (2001a Duczynski ( , 2001b ) I observe some tendency of money changes to precede per capita output changes (I use the Summers-Heston data set for output per capita). Since it is more natural to observe monetary changes to precede output changes (the monetary policy is plausibly effective with a lag), I can speculate that the quality of the Summers-Heston data might be better than the quality of the GDP data of the International Monetary Fund.
In addition, the paper examines the average output performance in the years in which consumer prices declined. The output growth rate is below the long-run cross-country average in these situations. Thus the price level is procyclical. This observation underscores the importance of demand shocks in business fluctuations.
Channels of monetary policy
Money affects real output through the interest rate channel, the exchange rate channel, the equity channel, the bank lending channel, and the balance sheet channel. A monetary expansion leads to lower interest rates. Lower interest rates stimulate demand for investment 3 goods and consumer durable goods (the interest rate channel). In an open economy with flexible exchange rates, lower interest rates induce capital outflow and the exchange rate depreciation. This leads to higher net exports and higher output (the exchange rate channel).
Lower interest rates increase prices of securities. The wealth of households increases, which stimulates consumption (the equity channel). A monetary contraction decreases the supply of credit in an economy. This affects the real economy since many firms do not have easy substitutes for bank loans (the bank lending channel). A monetary contraction also decreases the net worth and cash flows of firms, which exacerbates problems with asymmetric information in credit markets (the balance sheet channel).
Monetary nonneutrality in selected previous studies
Friedman and Schwartz (1963) 1947 , September 1955 , December 1968 , April 1974 , August 1978 , and October 1979 show that these contractionary measures really had significant real effects. The effects of monetary policy were found to be more persistent in the postwar era than in the interwar period. Demand disturbances were observed to be a primary source of postwar economic fluctuations. Romer and Romer acknowledge the difficulty of the implementation of the narrative approach in the interwar period.
A complementary approach is the statistical approach (applied in the present paper). Attfield and Duck (1983) and Kormendi and Meguire (1984) are examples of studies which 4 use the statistical approach. These studies focus on the effects of unanticipated monetary changes. Attfield and Duck examine data from 11 countries. They show that monetary growth affects real output only if it is unpredictable and that the effectiveness of monetary policy decreases with the variance of the money growth. Kormendi and Meguire examine 47 countries, observing a short-run nonneutrality of money and a long-run monetary neutrality.
The maximum effect of a monetary shock on real output occurs within a year of the shock.
Consistently with the rational expectations hypothesis, Kormendi and Meguire observe that effectiveness of monetary policy decreases with the variance of monetary shocks. Table 1 is -7.17% (standard deviation 8.86%). The average g is 1.57% (118 observations, standard deviation 6.37%). The average g(+1) is 1.86% (112 observations, standard deviation 5.21%).
The results

Declines in M1
In comparison, the arithmetic average of the growth rates of output in the world between 1990 and 2000 is 3.62%. Both the average g and the average g(+1) differ significantly from 3.62% (the t-statistic is 3.50 for g and 3.58 for g(+1)). Thus there exists a statistically significant association between M1 and real output. Since the average for g(+1) exceeds the average for g, there is in some sense no tendency of money changes to precede output changes (although money declines are followed by slow growth of output, they are also preceded by slow output growth).
Declines in the monetary base
The growth of the monetary base is under the code 14 x (reserve money) in the International Financial Statistics. There are 242 observations in which the monetary base declined between 1990 and 2000 and for which output data are available. The average growth rate of the monetary base in these situations is -9.56% (standard deviation 9.67%). The average g is 2.54% (238 observations, standard deviation 5.47%). The average g(+1) is 2.48% 5 (231 observations, standard deviation 4.27%). Both of these averages are significantly below the long-run world average, 3.62% (the t-statistic is 3.05 for g and 4.06 for g(+1)). It is of some interest to compare the declines in the monetary base to the declines in M1. Although the average decline in the monetary base (9.56%) is larger than the average decline in M1 (7.17%), the behavior of output is not so adverse for the monetary base. Thus M1 is more strongly associated with real output than the monetary base.
Declines in M2
The growth rate of M2 is under the code 35l x (money plus quasi money) in the International Financial Statistics. There are 74 observations in which M2 declined and for which output data are available (see Table 2 ). The average growth rate of M2 is -7.44% in these situations. The average output growth rate g is 0.63% (74 observations, standard deviation 8.34%). The average g(+1) is 2.16% (70 observations, standard deviation 6.12%).
The average g is significantly below the world long-run average, 3.62% (the t-statistic is 3.08). The average g(+1) is also significantly below the world average (the t-statistic is 2.00).
If the declines in M2 are compared to the declines in the monetary base, it follows that the behavior of real output is more adverse for the declines in M2 (both for g and g(+1)) despite the fact that the average decline in the monetary base (9.56%) exceeds the average decline in M2 (7.44%). Thus M2 is more strongly associated with real output than the monetary base.
We observe only a small difference if the declines in M2 are compared to the declines in M1.
The average decline in M2 (7.44%) only slightly exceeds the average decline in M1 (7.17%).
The average decline in M2 would be smaller if we excluded the decline of 63.3% in Bulgaria in 1993. The average of g for the declines in M2 (0.63%) is below the average of g for the declines in M1 (1.57%). On the other hand, the average of g(+1) for the declines in M2 (2.16%) is above the average of g(+1) for the declines in M1 (1.86%). For the declines in M2, the arithmetic average of the averages of g and g(+1) is 1.40%. For the declines in M1, the arithmetic average of the averages of g and g(+1) is 1.72%. Thus, the behavior of output is somewhat more adverse for the declines in M2 than for the declines in M1. This is (limited) evidence that M2 is more strongly associated with real output than M1. 6 
High growth of M1
This section considers situations in which M1 grew at a higher rate than 50% per year (see Table 3 ). The average g is 1.69% (standard deviation 6.08%, 95 observations). This is significantly below the world average of 3.62% (the t-statistic is 3.09). The average of g (+1) is 2.59% (standard deviation 5.44%, 90 observations). This is marginally significantly below 3.62% (the t-statistic is 1.80). Thus the rapid growth of money is connected with slow growth of output.
Declines in consumer prices
The growth of consumer prices is under the code 64 x in the International Financial Statistics. For declines in consumer prices, the average growth rate of output is 2.65% (standard deviation 5.34%, 57 observations). This average is lower than the world long-run average 3.62%. However, the given difference is statistically insignificant (the t-statistic is 1.37). This is limited evidence that the price level is procyclical.
Conclusion
This paper studies the association between nominal monetary aggregates and real output in extreme situations between 1990 and 2000 in a large number of countries. The output growth performance is below average both for high money growth rates and for declines in money.
The association between the monetary base and real output is weaker than the association between M1 (or M2) and real output. For declines in money in T, the growth rate of output between T and T+1 (following the decline in money) is not lower than the growth rate of output between T-1 and T (preceding the decline in money). In this sense there is no tendency of money changes to precede output changes. In addition, the paper provides (limited) evidence that the price level is procyclical (declines in consumer prices are connected with a below-average output growth performance). This observation stresses the importance of demand shocks in business fluctuations.
8 Table 1 : Growth rates of M1 and real output in the years in which M1 declined. 
